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Grand Bargain or Grand Illusions? Trade, Finance, and
Security Challenges
William A. Lovett*
In the early 1990s, "Western Internationalist" euphoria was dominant. As
communism collapsed, the "Western" OECD' democratic market economy/welfare
states remained the primary models for development. Most developing countries
in Asia, Latin America, and even some African states accepted this trend. Russia
and East Europe had switched to "democracy and liberal prosperity."
Authoritarian regimes were widely failing and in retreat. Saddam Hussein's Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was routed in early 1991 by a led coalition. The United
Nations enjoyed resurgence as a mechanism for peace-keeping. Meanwhile, the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and new World Trade Organization
("WTO") promoted more open trading and capital markets. Regional economic
integration was strengthened in the wider European Union ("EU"), North
American Free Trade Association ("NAFTA"), Association of South East Asian
Nations ("ASEAN"), and Mercosur (for South American nations-Argentina,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay). A Wilsonian trend of broadening
democracy, freer trade, and world peace seemed to be under way. The United
States played a strong leadership role for all of this in the early-mid 1990s, seeing
itself as the "sole superpower" or "indispensable" nation. By the later 1990s,
however, realists observed that a multipolar system had replaced a brief period of
U.S. hegemony. The new international relations framework still allowed scope
for American initiative but was constrained by a need for extensive support from
other nations.
By 2003 to 2004, this new framework was under strain and was possibly
unraveling. Rogue states, international terrorists, and nuclear proliferation
threatened U.S. interests and world peace, especially in the Mid-East. The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and War with Iraq strained that region and could expand the
dangers of terrorism. Although Great Powers (United States, EU, Russia, China,
Japan, and India) in the UN Security Council renewed weapons inspections in
Iraq in the fall of 2002, considerable disagreement remained in the United States
and world community about the next steps. Many believed that Saddam
Hussein's regime would get significant nuclear and other Weapons of Mass
Destruction ("WMD") capability within several years. This led to a choice in
2003, between the United States and allied intervention, to eliminate Hussein's
regime or impose a stronger network of containment, nuclear deterrence, and
surveillance from the United States and the UN Security Council. The Bush
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administration chose military intervention and regime change. Many nations
disagreed. This Iraq war was controversial and its longstanding effects would
depend upon how a successor regime could be established.
Meanwhile, faith in global free trade and open capital markets weakened,
especially among new industrial countries ("NICs") and less developed countries
("LDCs"). In the early mid-1990s, a "Grand Bargain" seemed to be forming
between developing and industrial nations. Let global markets remain "free" in
the long run but allow developing and industrial nations an extended period
(eight to twenty-five years perhaps) in which they could still employ substantial
tariffs, subsidies, and restrictions to foster industrial and economic catch-up.
Major asymmetries would be tolerated because multinational corporations
("MNCs") could relocate manufacturing operations to lower-wage countries. Job
losses or "transfers" would hurt advanced nations, but their sales and profits
could be extended by the MNCs (based mainly in the advanced OECD nations).
Service activities (especially those involving high "tech," computers, telecoms,
banking, finance, insurance, and securities) would be enhanced in the most
advanced countries and spread to developing nations. In this way economic
"progress" would broaden and be shared more widely. Big new capital flows
surged into "emerging markets," at least for some years. These OECD
investments and trading activities helped sustain the "bull market" of 1993-2000
(especially benefiting the United States). Ironically, more capital from abroad
also found its way back into the U.S. dollar and stock market, which covered
growing U.S. trade deficits.
Unfortunately, economic "progress" of the 1990s was shared unevenly.
Many areas felt short-changed and left out. The United States did well overall
(despite losses of manufacturing jobs in many communities), until its stock
market slumped in 2001-2002. Most of the EU countries did reasonably well
during this decade, as did Australia and Canada. ASEAN, Taiwan, and South
Korea did well until the Asian crises of 1997-1998, with uneven recoveries
thereafter. China did very well, although pockets of unemployment, poverty, and
adjustment strains are problems. Japan held its own, more slowly, with continued
export success. Japan, however, worries about low wage competition from the
rest of Asia. India progressed, though not as rapidly as the Chinese. Most of
Latin America did reasonably well, although Brazil, Argentina, Columbia, and
Venezuela recently slumped. Conversely, the majority of Islamic states suffered
slower growth or stagnation, and most of Africa was stagnant or worse. In Russia
and Eastern Europe, the restructuring and building of sound market institutions
took longer than many expected, but by the late 1990s, recovery was under way.
Following the 1990's prosperity, the world slumped into general recession from
2001 to 2002 and most countries became more defensive in trade bargaining.
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Disciplines of international finance intensified this reluctance toward further
opening. Most countries had to limit balance of payments and current account
deficits. When nations allowed themselves to become "dependent" on large
capital inflows from abroad, financial markets raised questions about the
"reliability" of these foreign investments. When profits and interest payments to
foreigners and MNCs are unreliable, and/or people worry about devaluation of
their currency, capital flight follows (and capital inflows turn into capital
outflows). As capital markets opened more fully (typically following IMF
advice), a vulnerability to capital flow reversals increased. Worries about global
industrial competition and excess capacity, especially from the Chinese giant,
now make most NICs and LDCs reluctant to open themselves any more to
imports. Also, rising new service industries, banks, finance, telecoms, etc., in
developing countries want limits on competition from leading MNCs of the
OECD bloc. For all these reasons, most NICs and LDCs are now reluctant to
move toward the rapid market opening contemplated in the early 1990s. In other
words, transitional protection is being extended. We see now a widespread retreat
from universal free trade and laissez fake.
As these insecurities and problems increased over the last five years, the
"Grand Bargain" on globalization between developing and advanced countries
has been challenged. NICs and LDCs complain of increased global competition
for manufacturing, serious currency devaluation risks, and major recession risks
(at their end). While many people gained, the majority remain relatively poor and
insecure. The developing countries want more safeguard relief, more access to
richer country markets, reduced MNC property protection, and lower
pharmaceutical prices. In short, they seek to realign the "Grand Bargain" in their
favor. Meanwhile, advanced countries suffered slowdown and slump in their
"post-bubble" economy, and accumulated job losses have been worrisome at
their end. Most advanced countries want better safeguard relief, more worker and
investor protections, and see little or no need to revise the "Grand Bargain" in
favor of developing countries. In fact, a broad dissenting class among both
advanced countries and developing nations complains about the excesses of
"globalization." Most critics want stronger limits on globalization, although
achieving consensus will be difficult among these conflicting critiques.
In this situation, the long-term strength of the U.S. dollar has been called into
question. The dollar has been the dominant world currency since World War II,
when U.S. industries had a predominant position in the world economy.
However, Europe, later Japan, and more recently South Korea, the ASEAN
group, and now China, have become major industrial rivals. The United States is
no longer economically predominant, and moreover, during the last few years the
EU's euro became the currency for twelve important nations, with a clout
comparable to the United States in population, output, and global market
strength. Further, EU countries now maintain an overall balance in trade with
other parts of the world and do not depend on foreign lending or investments to
maintain their standard of living. In dramatic contrast, the United States has
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suffered increasingly larger trade deficits since 1983 and sizeable current account
deficits since 1985. For the last twenty years, U.S. trade deficits totaled negative
$4,000 billion and current account deficits totaled negative $3,500 billion. From
2003 to 2004, the U.S. trade deficits were over negative $500 billion, and the
U.S. current account deficits are now negative $600 billion (over five percent of
the U.S. Gross Domestic Product ("GDP")). External account deficits of this
magnitude are simply unsustainable for the United States.
For several years after its launch in 1998, the euro sank from an initial value
of $1.17 per dollar to a low of $0.82, which reflected a lack of global confidence
in European industrial growth and stock prices as compared to the U.S. economy
and its surging bull market. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. Dow Jones industrial
average trebled, while the NASDAQ multiplied more than six-fold. Since those
peaks in early 2000, the Dow Jones average declined by roughly one-third, the
NASDAQ by two-thirds. Meanwhile, the euro recovered to rough parity with the
dollar or about $1.00 per euro in the summer and fall of 2002, and surged back
up to $1.35 per euro by November 2004.
Many international economists now believe the U.S. dollar was overvalued
with respect to the euro and other currencies. The question is by how much? The
answer will be worked out in the next few years. That answer depends upon: (i)
real growth rates (discounted for inflation) for the United States and EU; (ii)
government budget deficits for the United States and EU; (iii) trade and current
account deficits for the United States and EU; (iv) global and domestic
confidence in the debt and stock markets for the United States and EU; (v)
success or failure in military operations and relative security for the United States
and EU; and (vi) overall political cohesion, public morale, and sound
administration in the United States and EU. Relatively speaking, the United
States did well compared to the EU between 1993 and 2000. Between 2000 and
2002 the EU caught up some, and/or the U.S. post-bubble and September 11,
2001, slump reduced relative confidence in the United States dollar between
2001 and 2003, as compared to the EU and the euro. What will be the verdict of
history and markets between 2003 and 2008? And beyond? Time will tell, but the
quality and wisdom of U.S. finance, trade, and security policies will have a lot to
do with these outcomes. Also, the success (or failures) of U.S. and foreign
military operations, alliance relationships, and defense efforts will be important,
too.
In this period of strain for global security, trading, and finance, there is a
resurgence of realism, with less naive optimism. The majority of countries want
broader world peace, expanding prosperity, and more productive collaboration.
But in our multi-polar world, with less hegemonic influence from the United
States, the challenge of achieving better results is tougher. We are learning that
the UN's Security Council and General Assembly, the IMF, and the WTO cannot
easily fashion multilateral policies that guarantee results. Regional and bilateral
deals, and even unilateral action, may be the only way forward on some issues.
Achieving greater "flex" is essential for international trade-finance. It's worth
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emphasizing that the gradual, increased world growth, trade and prosperity from
the late 1940s through 2000 occurred largely from loosely coordinated, but
mainly national and regional efforts involving the United States, much of the
former British Commonwealth, the European Community (EEC becoming the
EU), key Asian nations (Japan, the four smaller tigers: Taiwan, South Korea,
Hong King and Singapore, and more recently, ASEAN, China and India),
together with some Muslim oil states (particularly from the Persian Gulf).2
Obviously, a central challenge over the coming years will be how to sustain
and broaden this prosperity. As most OECD nations slowed or stalled in 2000 to
2002, so did most developing nations (NICs and LDCs). Was this a temporary
cyclical pause, or a potential world depression as occurred in the 1930s? The
answer depends upon evolving finance-trade policies, and the prospects for
limiting disruptive conflict and terrorism. Clearly, the tragic events of September
11, 2001 remind all that healthy economic performance depends upon preserving
security for most countries in the global economy.
I. COORDINATED FLEX FOR ECONOMIC, FINANCE,
AND TRADE POLICIES
To understand the need for "coordination" and "flex" in national economic
policies we must set aside two grand illusions. First, laissez faire markets
automatically coordinate all global investment, trading, and economic activity to
best advantage all peoples in every nation without any significant government
nurturing or regulation. This nalve approach broke down in the Great Depression.
In response, modern social democracies used "New Deal" and Keynesian
policies to promote fuller employment, along with social insurance to limit
misfortune and suffering from "excesses" of the marketplace. National
budgeting, taxes, supports, and regulation are chief instruments for these policies.
Such policies were crystallized in the years soon after World War II among most
successful OECD economies. Later, most countries also had to learn to limit
"excesses" of government including excess budget deficits, widespread inflation,
overblown taxes, costly subsidies and regulations, and undue distortions. Getting
the right balance, of course, can be controversial. But most budget, tax, and
regulatory policies are the responsibility of national governments.
2. In spite of the Cold War (from 1946 to 1990) between the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics
("USSR"), the United States, and NATO countries, the global economy-investments, technology, and trade-
improved greatly over the last 55 years. Some even believe that the U.S., U.S.S.R. bipolar balance (with only
limited military conflict) strongly promoted a world order and relative peace that allowed OECD nations, at
least, and some of their favored NICs and LDCs, to progress and share in a remarkable up-surge in world living
standards and technology.
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Second, multilateral governance can be established through the UN, IMF,
and WTO to provide detailed management and correction of national macro-
economic, tax, and regulatory policies. This is an illusion-it is hard enough for
national governments and agencies to perform these functions. Multilateral
institutions lack the coherence and information for detailed management and
replacement of the national governments.
Thus, national governments still have the primary role in budget, tax, and
regulatory policies. Their executive leaders, finance ministers (or treasury
secretaries), central banks, trade ministers, and national legislatures are
responsible for healthy productivity, improving prosperity, and successful
engagement with world markets. Access to global markets, exports, imports,
capital, and technology are significant determinants of success, of course, and are
partly regulated and lightly supervised by the IMF, the Bank for International
Settlements, and WTO. But multilateral arrangements also need considerable
"flex" to serve their function of guiding and maintaining some oversight and
transparency and providing limited occasional assistance for the national
governments (e.g., balance of payments crises).
Paradoxically, both "coordination" and "flex" are crucial to sustainable
policies in the fields of international finance and trade. Failure to observe these
"dual" requirements explains a lot of the confusion, distress, and breakdowns in
recent policy-making. Some "coordination" is essential to mesh and ease the
conflicts between national policies that promote industries, finance, trade, and
prosperity. But national governments must ensure that their peoples benefit from
international finance, investment, and trading activities.
Considerable confusion on these issues comes from misunderstanding the
growing convergence and confederation of the EU countries. The fifteen EU
countries and another ten to fifteen additional candidates for EU are trying to
harmonize their monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. For a better
functioning, more integrated economy, and broader political benefits of an
enlarging EU federation, substantial coordination is desired. But EU countries are
not submitting to detailed governance by the IMF and/or WTO, nor should they.
The EU, like the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and India, needs substantial
"flex" and latitude for their currency's value, exports and imports, fiscal policies
and regional regulation.
A. Strains in the Finance Regime
Floating exchange rates, global capital markets, international banking, and
IMF stabilization "assistance" to countries suffering balance of payments and
adjustment problems are key features of international finance. In many ways this
finance system works reasonably well. Financial market disciplines (reinforced
by IMF surveillance) force most countries to live within their means, and they
have worked since the 1980s to greatly reduce inflation in many countries.
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IMF decision-making and conditionality disciplines evolved gradually during
the 1950s and 1960s. Weighted voting according to capitalization (overall size of
economies) was early established for the IMF's Executive Board. Super-majority
requirements assure blocking votes for both creditor countries and debtor nations,
as well as for the United States and EU, along with other sizable blocs.
Accordingly, IMF assistance is generally available for most countries but not too
generously. Most IMF assistance packages try to coordinate international bank
financing and continued access to global capital markets for other foreign
investments. Excess debt buildups are dealt with normally by stretching out or
rescheduling obligations, preserving national credit-worthiness, and limiting
disruptive defaults or financial breakdowns that could undermine later financial
support and investor confidence. In this way the stability of global financial
obligations and international bank lending can also be assured. These are sound
policies oriented toward resilience.
During the stressful 1970s and 1980s the IMF and international banks coped
with big crises. Any of these could have broken the post-World War II
prosperity, brought global panic, collapse, and depression. First came the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") I and II; oil-raw
materials price shocks of 1973 and 1974 and 1979 to 1981. Petro-dollar
recycling, liberal international bank credits, and IMF support eased the
immediate oil-food crisis, but excessive lending and credit expansion later
reinforced a world-wide inflation surge. Second, borrowing by developing
countries got out of hand, leaving many with debt overloads. When the United
States, Germany, Switzerland, U.K., and Japan cracked down on inflation in
1980-1981, with IMF encouragement, nearly eighty countries (mostly NICs and
LDCs) found themselves with excess debts that could not be serviced with
recession-reduced exports. A world debt overload crisis threatened international
insolvencies and general default. The IMF and international banks responded
with liberal debt rescheduling and stretchouts. Later in the early-1980s and
1990s, developing countries were encouraged to privatize much of their "public
sector" activities. Much of this debt was switched (and partly written down) into
equity investments widely accepted by OECD creditor nations. As many
developing countries recovered and partly privatized, renewed foreign
investments aided their recoveries. However, some of this capital flowed to
excess.
In the 1990s euphoria, unfortunately, excessive capital inflows hit many
emerging markets. Not surprisingly, these countries welcomed the additional
prosperity. However, speculative excess and asset bubbles proved unsustainable
in some countries. Nervous domestic and foreign investors soon reversed net
capital flows, thereby greatly shrinking foreign exchange reserves. In many of
these emerging market countries, large current account deficits accumulated
when their governments became dependent upon net foreign capital inflows to
sustain their economies. When confidence broke down, currency devaluation,
banking crises, and disruptive recessions often followed.
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Lessons drawn from these recurrent financial crises (Mexico, Asia, Russia,
South America) are that more caution and care in global finance must be
enforced-the "Washington consensus." Improved transparency, higher quality
accounting, and more investor prudence are needed. Stronger capital
requirements, tough prudential supervision, and closure before insolvency are
essential to strengthen banking regulation and insurance company regulation.
Securities disclosure and regulation, like that of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") are needed for all countries seeking investment from global
capital markets. And improved business bankruptcy laws and administration
(similar to Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States) can assure more efficient
salvage for distressed industrial business enterprises.
Restrictions are appropriate in many countries to limit excess capital inflows
(and inhibit speculative "bubbles"). Whether limits on capital "flight" can be
engineered for countries under strain is more doubtful. If business confidence
breaks down, capital flight and devaluation will be hard to avoid. Failing
governments normally try to "keep the lid on" a little while longer, but these
efforts are seen as warnings to "head for the exits." Not that many naive investors
and companies are left in the global economy.
Exchange rate regimes are a crucial variable. Reasonable flexibility with
floating potential seems necessary for most countries. Rigid pegging or fixed rate
regimes are vulnerable to stress, eroded confidence, and periodic breakdown
(except for little countries or island states that are closely linked in trade-
investment flows to major nations like the United States, EU, U.K., etc.).
Adoption of a major country's currency can work well for nearby satellite states.
However, the recent collapse and failure of Argentina's "dollarization" policy
illustrates serious difficulties for larger countries in adopting a distant country's
currency (with no close linkage in trade or investment flows).
Resurgent budget deficits and inflation pressures for Argentina, combined
with a major slowdown and more unemployment, destroyed confidence in the
Argentine Currency Board and its dollarization program. The new Argentina
peso then collapsed in value.
A dangerous problem still remains for the poorest countries that often lack
adequate infrastructure, secure property, market institutions, and government
competence. These countries feel left out in the march of economic progress.
Many suffer repressive governments that do not feel much responsibility to their
people beyond political sloganizing. The most tragic situations involve
grievously "failed" states, where barbarism, vicious civil wars, or thuggery have
taken over a people or an area (e.g., Liberia, Rwanda, Zaire, or Sierra Leone).
Unfortunately, failed states present urgent security problems that often spill over
into their neighbors or even more widely in the world community. With light
arms, explosives, rockets, and other weapons readily available (often supplied by
outside terrorist or criminal organizations), these problems are not simply
financial. For example, the accumulated problems of Afghanistan (after a ten-
year war against Russian intervention and civil wars thereafter) led to the
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ascendancy of the Taliban (closely linked with Osama bin Laden). Even decent,
well-governed countries with sound economic policies can be attacked or
destabilized this way. Sadly, as the world learned in the mid-late 1930s, there is
no substitute for timely and effective collective security measures. When rogue
states, fanatical terrorists, or irresponsible thugs gain momentum and intimidate
the peaceful countries, the stability of healthy trade-finance can be undermined
for many nations.
Finally, the U.S. government must give careful attention to the gradually
accumulated but excessive and unsustainable U.S. trade and current account
deficits. Within reasonable limits, net capital flows into the United States were
logical for the last twenty years. They reflected a bigger, more reliable, and
prospering U.S. capital and equity market. But when Japan, China, and many
developing countries under-valued their currencies to stimulate exports and
followed neo-mercantilist trade strategies to restrict unwanted imports of
manufactures, a serious "structural" trade-finance imbalance problem developed.
By 2004, U.S. current account deficits reached nearly six percent of gross
national product ("GNP"), and U.S. net indebtedness to other nations approached
thirty percent of GNP. Eliminating these excessive, unsustainable external
deficits requires major international currency realignments (not only for the EU,
U.K., Canada, and Australia, but also for China, Japan, and other Asian nations).3
In addition, neo-mercantilist and unequally open trade policies must be phased
out. The United States must enforce more reciprocity, more equal openness, and
better balanced trade flows. U.S. trade partners will be reluctant to cut their large
export surpluses by themselves, so this adjustment process is likely to be
stressful. But the United States and its trade partners must realize that the
elimination of U.S. current account deficits requires a mix of U.S. import cuts
and export increases. It can be spread over a few years, but overall balance must
be enforced.
3. By December 2004, the EU euro and U.K. pound were overvalued, but China's currency was
substantially under-valued (perhaps by 20 to 25 percent).
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Chart 1
Conflicting "Freer Trade" Outlooks
Adam Smith's Freer Trade National Development
(Reciprocity Oriented) Freer Trade (With
Development Tariffs, e.g.,
Hamilton and Friedrich List)
British Empire Freer Trade
(With Restricted Foreign Access
to British Colonies)
*Neo-Classical Freer Trade
(One World Model - Everyone
Supposedly Gains)
* Cobdenite, Wilsonian Freer Trade
(Free Trade, Democracy, and
World Peace)
U.S. Cold War Freer Trade
(Led By U.S. and OECD,
Preferences for the Developing
Nations Accepted by U.S.)
*Reciprocity Freer Trade
(Led By U.S. to More Equal
Openness, With Preference Only






* UNCTAD - Group of 77 Plus
Freer Trade (With Strong NIC,
LDC Preference)
9WTO Model Freer Trade
(Strong LDC Preferences, With
Aspirations for Gradually More
Opening)
.MNC Oriented Freer Trade
(Freedom for MNCs to Operate
Everywhere, Subject to
Restrictions By Developing
Nations to Promote Their
Industrialization)
* Neo-Mercantilist Freer Trade
(Exploit Openness of Others, But Insist Upon Limits to
Protect Key Industries, Interests, or Trades)
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B. Strains in the Trade Regime
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") trade regime
promoted freer trade (led by U.S. tariff concessions) with important loopholes,
off-sets, safeguards, anti-dumping, and countervailing subsidy provisions. The
United States came out of World War II with dominant industries, big export
surpluses, and overly protected markets. In the early Cold War years the United
States could afford to open itself to imports and sponsor a broad "free world"
alliance against communism. Thus, the United States did not fully enforce its
own trade laws and 1947 GATT remedies to maintain overall trade reciprocity.
The United States accepted increasingly asymmetrical trading relationships in
which U.S. companies moved much of their manufacturing overseas to benefit
from lower wages and locally protected markets. Likewise, so did Western
European and Japanese companies. However, as more jobs moved "downstream"
to lower wage countries, a blacklash of U.S. unionized labor, smaller businesses,
and farmers objected. In the mid-1980s, as the IMF was trying to orchestrate
successive LDC debt rescheduling, there were widespread fears of renewed
"protectionism" like in the 1930s. Financial meltdown and heavy protection
could be a disaster. This worry stimulated efforts toward a broader international
trade negotiation (the Uruguay Round, 1985-1994), designed to "save the
system." MNCs and international banks wanted to secure their advantages, and to
provide greater continuity. The WTO was created with "stronger" dispute
resolution mechanisms. The "final" Uruguay Round results were the GATT
1994-WTO agreements.
The GATT 1994-WTO trade regime has three major characteristics: (i)
extensive asymmetries or unequal openness, entrenched by the new WTO's
dispute resolution process; (ii) strong conservative momentum with little
incentive for favored "protected" interests (free riders) to open themselves up or
to equalize import access; and (iii) voting in the WTO that relies mainly upon
"one country one vote," i.e., UN General Assembly style voting, so that the great
majority of developing countries need not yield to pressures for greater
reciprocity from nations that may be losing net market shares, real incomes, or
jobs to "emerging nations." This style of voting plays out in the current logjam of
conflicting proposals for the Doha WTO round of trade negotiations and limits
much change in "multilateral" trade relations. According to "bicycle theory"
advocates, however, it is vital for MNC interests to "keep full control" of trade
negotiations so that no general unraveling or widespread relapse into
''protectionism" occurs.
A big complication is the very large U.S. "structural" trade and current
account deficit problem. For twenty years the United States has run large external
deficits, totaling more than negative $4,000 billion of merchandise trade deficits
and negative $3,500 billion in current account deficits. Annual U.S. trade-current
account deficits reached almost six percent of U.S. GDP in 2004. Extraordinary
U.S. external deficits of this magnitude are not sustainable over the long run.
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Their recent tolerance by the global economy reflected two factors: (i)
ascendancy of the U.S. dollar as primary reserve currency; and (ii) enjoyment of
the U.S. bull market (with somewhat higher U.S. interest rates) by EU, Japanese,
and other OECD, NIC, and LDC investors as a parking place for investment
resources. Now that the U.S. stock market and economy has slumped, the EU's
euro is challenging the dollar's dominance. As the European Central Bank
("ECB") held its interest rates steadier since 2001, deeper interest rate cuts by the
U.S. Federal Reserve have brought U.S. rates somewhat below EU rates in 2001-
2003. Now, many experts see a likely tougher euro challenge in the coming
years.
U.S. leaders must be ready to take strong action if a major shortfall of
investment funds is threatened, and a seriously disruptive recession and/or dollar
devaluation crisis hits the United States. What are the best policy responses?
Realistic contingency planning is in order.
U.S. policy should target "fundamental flaws" in the current world trade
regime: (i) we need to correct unsustainable U.S. trade imbalances and
asymmetries that cannot continue much longer; (ii) we should suspend
unconditional, non-reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment ("MFN") in GATT
Article I that entrenches unbalanced trade and investment flows; and (iii) we
must understand that reciprocal trading-investment relationships will be achieved
more sensitively through bilateral and regional bargaining. The present WTO
with 144 national members (and only one vote for the United States) is incapable
of prompt, responsible action to reform trading relationships in any serious
global-U.S. dollar crisis situation. Nor is the WTO inclined to help the United
States ease its balance of payments problems.
Fortunately, this "logjam problem" is increasingly recognized in the global
marketplace. Nobody really expects another WTO round to change anything very
much. This is why, in fact, multinational lobbying interests need this WTO round
so badly-to maintain their system. Yet the United States will be expected to "do
something" promptly and effectively in a global-dollar crisis situation. It is
important psychologically that the U.S. act with ample "consultation" among
significant trade partners, with "sensitivity" to the vital interests of other
countries. The global marketplace is bound together in mutual interdependence.
Accordingly, U.S. policy should emphasize GATT Article XII, Balance of
Payments relief measures, with one important extra twist-careful joint and
independent action to eliminate and excessive and unsustainable U.S. trade
deficits with key trading partners. Most of the U.S. trade-current account deficit
problem arises out of only a few relationships: U.S.-Japan trade, U.S.-China
4. In early GATr-round years, approximately 1946 to 1967, when the United States enjoyed a big
financial, industrial, and technological lead over its trade partners, U.S. support for "unconditional MFN" was
reassuring to "catch up countries" in Europe, Japan, and developing nations. But by the late 1990s it was
becoming clear that reciprocity ("conditional MFN") was now more appropriate for world trade, except for the
poorest and least developed countries, that need more kindness and protection for infant industries.
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trade, U.S.-ASEAN trade, and to a lesser extent, U.S.-EU trade and U.S.-NAFTA
trade. This is a manageable list of key bilateral-regional relationships. IMF
consultation is also built into GATT Article XII, Balance of Payments relief, and
the GATT 1994 Understanding on Balance of Payments Problems. Fortunately,
the IMF's executive board is a more flexible, workable institution (with weighted
voting and healthy traditions) than the WTO's General Council and occasional
trade round negotiations (with consensus agreement expectations) and entrenched
asymmetries.
Interestingly, the Bush administration and its U.S. Trade Representative,
Robert Zoellick, have already implemented a broader, more supple trade
negotiation strategy. The United States now gives equal emphasis to three
simultaneous tracks for trade negotiations: (i) multilateral negotiations and the
WTO; (ii) regional negotiations and the Free Trade Area for the Americas
("FTAA"); and (iii) bilateral trade relations. This is the only sensible way to go
for U.S. trade policy
Fortunately, the logjam of conflicting agenda and demands in the Doha
round explains the constraints and the limited "give" in global trade
arrangements. NICs want more safeguard relief (from the advanced countries and
each other), less risk to their employment, business potential, and growth
5. Of course, the United States must be prepared, if necessary, to exercise its withdrawal rights under
Article XV of the WTO Agreement. Only six months notice is needed for U.S. withdrawal. Withdrawal would
signal to all U.S. trade partners that further trade access into U.S. markets will be governed by bilateral and
regional arrangements. A convenient structure might be the following "A,B,C,D" tiered access to U.S. markets:
(i) "A class countries" with minimal tariffs and open capital markets would enjoy minimal U.S.
tariffs and restrictions. Most OECD countries fit this framework already; (ii) "B class
countries" would get 8-10 percent U.S. tariffs. This would apply to nations using 10-20 percent
average tariffs and somewhat restricted capital markets; (iii) "C class countries" would get 15-
20 percent U.S. tariffs. This would apply to nations with 25-50 percent tariffs and substantial
capital and intellectual property restrictions; and (iv) "D class countries" would face greatly
restricted access to U.S. markets, and now offer only very limited access to their own markets,
with little or no opportunity for capital flows and/or intellectual property protection. With this
reciprocity-based ladder of conditional access to U.S. markets, countries could choose the
degree of openness they prefer in trading with the United States (and vice versa). Special GSP
preferences could still be given to the poorest countries, i.e., those not yet capable of handling
more reciprocal trade with the United States and other OECD nations. This new A, B, C, D
system of graduated access would solve the "free rider" and "asymmetry" problems left
uncorrected by the Tokyo GATT Round (1974-79) and the Uruguay-WTO Round (1985-94).
Trade flows could be much better balanced this way, and the U.S. "structural" trade and
current account deficits could be quickly eliminated after a few years.
An interesting question is whether the United States should consider WTO withdrawal and tougher trade
bargaining in the early stages of its new War on Terrorism and the current WTO negotiating "round" launched
at Doha, Qatar in November 2001. It probably does not need to for awhile. But the United States does not need
to "subsidize" a new WTO round with costly one way concessions any longer. In the long run, U.S. "partners"
in the global economy-security system must carry their "fair share" of the load. Americans have carried heavier
defense burdens than most of its allies for 50 years (except for a few nations with special vulnerability, e.g.,
Israel or South Korea.) When the United States enjoyed substantially higher living standards and an industrial
lead, a policy of unequal trade openness seemed acceptable. Now, however, American tolerance for "free
riding" and unequal burden sharing is approaching its limits.
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prospects from the world market. LCD's agree, but stress their lack of sufficient
benefits in recent export expansion and foreign capital investments. Dissimilarly,
most advanced countries (like the United States, EU, and Japan) are conflicted.
They seek expanded exports and growth, but many domestic interests are
concerned with limiting dislocations for labor, business, and environmental
progress. Faith has eroded that freer world markets guarantee good results. Most
nations represented at the Doha Ministerial have interests and sectors that offer
little room for additional "concessions" or risky openings, except from "other
nations." Yet, MNC lobbies feel strongly that their dominance and opportunities
must be "protected" to prevent an unraveling of global prosperity. At the heart of
the Doha round difficulties is another grand illusion. The world has not
established universal, reciprocal free trade with a level playing field. However, in
the United States and other OECD countries, the Uruguay Round and WTO were
packaged and sold as equal, fair, and reciprocal free trade. Yet, developing
nations think they got a permanent system of LDC preferences. In fact, this is a
double illusion trading system, quite vulnerable to breakdown and
misunderstanding.6
In fact, the Collapse in Cancun of the WTO Ministerial Conference in
September 2003, and the "Two Track Outcome" of the Miami FTAA talks in
November 2003, suggest that U.S. trade bargaining is already moving toward
selective bilateralism. Many NICs and LDCs insist upon retaining substantial
tariffs, subsidies, restrictions, and limitations upon foreign MNCs. The United
States is focusing further trade negotiations on countries (like most OECD
nations) that are willing to accept more complete openness for goods, services,
and capital flows. With heavy, unsustainable U.S. trade and current account
deficits, it is time for the United States to limit unconditional MFN treatment,
and impose more reciprocity. The United States should enforce conditional MFN
as the basis for continuing trade relationships. This allows U.S. trade partners to
select the degree of openness they prefer in dealings with the United States and
other OECD nations. This deference and sensitivity to the needs of most NICs
and LDCs will be appreciated abroad, and yet it greatly limits the dangers of
excessive free riding and non-reciprocity.
6. Diplomacy often uses illusions and creates ambiguities to paper over important conflicts of interest,
perceptions, and ideology among countries. The best diplomats must be realists. The architects of diplomatic
ambiguity and illusion should know better, fully understand their game, and appreciate the "realities" and
implications of the modus vivendi that they create and maintain.
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II. STRAINS IN THE SECURITY REGIME
Two stages in modern world history seemed to bring great opportunities for
broad peace, widespread democracy, general arms reductions, and international
collaboration. The first opening came after World War I between 1919 and 1934,
and the next came after the Cold War between 1991 and 2001.
A. Lessons from the Interwar Era
The victorious allies (led by Britain, France, Italy, the United States and
Japan) that defeated the central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and
Bulgaria) seemed reasonably cooperative after World War II. After drastic
demilitarization measures that weakened Germany, Austria, and Turkey, the only
major security challenge to the Allies came from the new Bolshevik government
in the U.S.S.R. (and Russian efforts to promote international communism). In
1921, the Washington Naval Conference successfully limited expensive postwar
battleship construction rivalry among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.
Then, a rapid draw-down in allied military forces seemed reasonable and
appropriate. President Wilson's rigidity prevented U.S. Senate ratification and
entry into the new League of Nations, which had unfortunate consequences in the
1930s. Yet, this did not prevent active U.S. diplomacy between 1921 and 1932
(e.g., the Dawes plan, Anglo-American debt restructuring, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, various U.S. efforts at mediation and peacekeeping, and Stimson's non-
recognition doctrine in response to Japan's occupation of Manchuria).
Sadly, the Great Depression and a rise of anti-military pacifism brought
timidity to Britain and France between 1932 and 1938, and isolationism to the
United States between 1932 and 1939.
The collective security weakness of the western democracies came just when
Hitler's Germany and militaristic Japan were rearming rapidly between 1933 and
1938, and Mussolini's Italy conquered Ethiopia between 1935 and 1936. Only
Stalin's Russia (caught between expanding German and Japanese power)
substantially rearmed itself between 1933 and 1938. Meanwhile, in the Spanish
Civil War (1936 to 1939) the Russians actively supported Leftist Spanish
Republicans against Franco's fascist forces backed by Germany and Italy.
Most tragically, Hitler's aggressive German rearmament in 1933 through
1938 emphasized new break-through weapons of air power (the Luftwaffe) and
mechanized armored vehicles (Panzer divisions). Germany gained an edge in air-
armored forces that helped intimidate the British government between 1935 and
1938, leaving the French alone to focus on their fortified frontier defenses-the
Maginot line. Depression era finances also crippled the willingness of Britain and
France to make comparable efforts and budget outlays in these new decisive
weapons of air power and panzer forces. Ironically, Germany's new military
edge was only a few years of lead time from rapid re-armament (1933-1937).
Had Britain, France, and the United States rearmed earlier (from 1933-1937) and
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acted together with strong collective security measures, Germany would have
been outmatched and unable to make more than limited gains (e.g., Austria and
perhaps the Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia). However, the idea that Hitler
could really want another war seemed unlikely to British and French leaders until
the fall of 1938. And even then, some British-French conservatives hoped that
Hitler would be satisfied with gains in central Europe and against communist
Russia.
Ironically, British governments under Stanley Baldwin and Neville
Chamberlain (1933-1938) made major economic recovery and broader industrial
employment gains. Had Hitler been satisfied with modest frontier adjustments in
the East (which Chamberlain wanted "to appease"), World War II could have
been unnecessary in Europe. Japanese aggressions in Asia would have been more
limited, too, without the support of a very powerful Germany and Axis alliance.
Thus, collective security among the Western Democracies was sadly neglected
in a critical, brief period of economic distress, i.e., 1933-1937. Hitler secretly
rearmed Germany from 1933-1935 to create an air force larger than Britain's, and
rapidly expanded his army with more tanks and mechanized forces than Britain
maintained. The French re-armed somewhat, but concentrated too much on the
Maginot line. The French neglected their air forces, and failed to organize their tanks
(comparable in number to the Germans) into panzer divisions and mechanized corps.
In this way, Germany broke open the fronts of World War I-style infantry and
artillery with Blitzkrieg offenses of massed panzer divisions and heavy tactical air
support from 1939-1941.
The biggest Allied blunder (Britain, France, and the United States) was the
failure of imagination. Why would any "responsible leader" want rearmament
and war in the Great Depression? Obviously, Hitler's Nazi Germany, Japan's
militarists, and even (to a modest degree) Mussolini's Italy found rearmament
and successful wars against weak and timid opponents attractive, not only to
achieve fuller employment recovery, but to "get back against and triumph" over
the Western democracies (led by Britain, France, and the United States).
Only Winston Churchill stood out from 1933-1938 as a lonely realist,
correctly identifying the German military and air power dangers, and stoutly
warning of the need for stronger Allied rearmament. It took the humiliation of
Munich (September 1938) and Prague (full German occupation of all
Czechoslovakia in the Spring of 1939) to awaken Britain and France to their
dangers. Rapid British-French rearmament finally followed (five years late), and
World War II began in September 1939. By then Hitler was over-confident, and
thought Germany could win a string of decisive, quick victories with an edge in
Luftwaffe superiority and panzer divisions. Germany did come close to winning
World War II between 1940 and 1942. Many historians believe that Germany
could have won and retained hegemony in Europe if Hitler had concentrated his
forces on defeating Britain in the Mediterranean and Mid-East from 1941- 1942.
However, like Napoleon in 1812, Hitler could not resist the temptation or urge to
conquer Russia. Both Napoleon and Hitler suffered the same fate. By over-
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reaching, they both brought down against themselves too big an alliance, thereby
destroying their brief empires.
B. Post Cold War Problems
From 1991 to 1992 post-Cold War euphoria hit most of the world. Near
universal condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. led Gulf War
victory suggested that United Nations peacekeeping operations might be relied upon
generally. As the U.S.S.R. dismantled itself and reduced military forces, most NATO
allies and other democracies now felt they could substantially reduce their own
military forces. Between 1992 and 2001 a large scale draw-down in western military
forces occurred (by fifty to sixty-five percent overall), comparable in many ways to
the big Allied military force reductions of 1919-1934. Understandably, western
democracies wanted to economize on military budgets and forward deployments.
The risks of war now seemed modest. Only smaller scale, lightly-armed
peacekeeping forces seemed likely to find much use. Accordingly, in the United
States and western Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, most of Latin
America, and much of Africa, it became popular to condemn nuclear weapons and
"nuclear free" zones were proclaimed.
For some years into the late-1990s, the United States thought itself to be the
surviving sole superpower with a substantial lead in readily deployable forces. U.S.
defense leaders focused upon cutting U.S. nuclear warhead stocks and delivery
systems, hoping to lead and subsidize Russia into following rapidly with a
comparable reduction of nuclear arms. Some U.S. arms control enthusiasts argued
that drastic and near total nuclear weapons cutbacks were within reach, if only
unilateral U.S. reduction measures and negotiations were pressed hard enough.
Unfortunately, by 2002, the world looked considerably different. Russia's
national economy was greatly weakened. There was considerable Russian alienation
over NATO-EU expansion as well as with the response to Serbia, Bosnia, Kossovo,
and Chechnya. Soon, Russia's grand strategy changed. Russia now makes nuclear
weapons (strategic and tactical) their first line of defense. By not following the
United States in shrinking their nuclear forces, Russia gains a comfortable margin of
nuclear superiority-at least in terms of warhead stocks.
Under these circumstances, China felt obliged to increase its nuclear weapon
stocks and delivery capability too. Meanwhile, Chinese strength and support of
Pakistan's arms and missile program led India to substantially increase their nuclear
weapons program. Then Pakistan increased their nuclear weapons. Even though the
Pakistanis were outnumbered heavily by the Indians in all categories, Pakistan felt
safer with an assured nuclear deterrent of their own. The best estimates by 2002,
were that "rogue states" such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea soon would have limited
stockpiles of nuclear warheads, along with some delivery capability. Naturally, Israel
would likely enhance their own nuclear capability, threatened as they were by so
many hostile states in the Mid-East (after the collapse of peace negotiations and
resumption of the intifada and suicide bombings).
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Meanwhile, on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. airliners
and crashed three into the World Trade Center and Pentagon buildings. More
than 3,000 died outright, and soon thereafter systematic anthrax infections spread
in the United States (a form of biological warfare). Most Americans believed that
Osama bin Laden, the Al-Kaeda network, and Taliban in Afghanistan were
involved, and perhaps the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.
Understandably, in a changing security environment, the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan would reassess their defense policies and grand
strategies. Four new factors must be emphasized. First, multipolar power balance
replaces a brief period of U.S. unipolar ascendancy. The major draw down in the
U.S. military forces between 1991 and 2001 combined with more independent,
self-assertive policies in the EU, Russia, China, India, and Japan. While the
United States retains an edge over each of the other major powers in some
aspects of military and overall economic strength, we can no longer say the
United States is the "dominant superpower." Second, renewed importance for
nuclear weapons is evident from the resurgent emphasis on them by Russia,
China, India, Pakistan, and the nuclear programs of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.
All this means continued nuclear deterrence is vital for the United States, EU,
and Israel, along with a possible need in Japan for a nuclear weapons program.
Third, increased risks and vulnerability to terrorist attacks involving cities and
strategic installations applies to many countries. Broader availability for weapons
of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) plus computer and
electronic disruptions multiplies the potential costs. Most modem societies are
relatively open in many areas, especially near ports and sea coasts. It is hard for
these societies to defend against small groups, bombs, and missiles. Finally,
increased defensive strength of many nations operates when properly armed with
ample light weapons, missiles (air, land, or sea launched), with some aircraft
and/or light naval vessels. These factors make it harder to project force easily
into many parts of the world, except where very strong intervention forces are
willing to impose heavy disruption and/or loss of life on the target states (e.g.,
NATO's intervention against Serbia in the Kossovo War of 1999). Somewhat
greater deference and/or immunity may operate in favor of countries not so
vulnerable to air, naval, or ground interventions by outside powers. These
reasons explain why peacekeeping operations are more difficult in rough terrain.
Forests, mountains, or inaccessible hinterland areas are hard to reach by the
major powers. Many of the worst-failed state-peacekeeping tragedies (e.g.,
Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Southern Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone)
involved such circumstances. Afghanistan was difficult for the United States to
reach, except through Pakistan, the Turkestans (and Russia), and/or through the
Iranian border. Fortunately, the northern Alliance revolt against the Taliban was
aided effectively by U.S. air strikes and special forces. Additionally, the Taliban
had become unpopular and were not that numerous.
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Collective security alliances and measures (e.g., NATO's action in some
circumstances) are vital for preserving regional peace. Where sufficient
consensus is lacking (e.g., EU's peacekeeping in Bosnia in 1991-1995), these
efforts may be ineffectual. Effective counter measures for the United States and
its allies in Afghanistan needed regional support (especially Pakistan, the
Turkestans, Russia, and a closed-border with Iran). Maintaining the U.S. a la
carte coalition against the Taliban and Al-Kaeda network was a major challenge
for U.S. foreign policy, and poses an even greater problem in Iraq for 2003-2004
and beyond.
Responsible states (e.g., the United States, EU, and other OECD nations)
need enough military strength to intervene effectively for peacekeeping and
overall deterrence. Lack of such strength was the tragic lesson for western
democracies in the mid-late 1930s. In most of the Cold War (1949-1991), by
contrast, stronger U.S. and NATO forces were able to deter major aggressions.
Ample allied strength existed for the Gulf War victory in from 1990-1991, which
renewed faith in collective security for a few years thereafter. Unfortunately, the
western democratic alliance must be seen as having the moral fortitude to use
strength in appropriate circumstances. When their will to act seems lacking,
aggressors (e.g., North Korea in 1950, Iraq in 1990, or Serbia from 1992-1994
(Bosnia), and from 1998-1999 (Kosovo)) can take advantage of apparent
weakness. With the benefit of hindsight, many experts now believe that the
military drawdowns of the United States, EU, and other OECD nations went too
far. Considerable rebuilding of nuclear, air, naval, and deployable ground forces
is now in order. The EU should increase its forces too. If undertaken promptly,
this renewal of military strength will help secure nation building in Afghanistan
and Iraq, bolster the western coalition, and offset rogue state buildups or other
adventuristic actions elsewhere.
If western democracies neglect military needs, especially in the area of
nuclear warheads, naval, and air forces, there is danger that Russian, Chinese,
and/or rogue state forces could reach a level of "effective immunity" within a
few years.
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In other words, nuclear and other potential hostile forces to the United States,
EU, and their allies could undercut the credibility of the United States, NATO,
and EU's collective security arrangements. Lessons from the 1930s, in this
regard, are clear. Three to five years of unmatched military, missile and nuclear
buildups by potentially hostile states to the United States, EU, and other OECD
nations could be dangerous. Nor are the buildups of potentially hostile states
terribly expensive. Wages are low for the militaries of Russia, China, India,
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and other possible rogue states. Unfortunately,
wage costs are much higher in the United States, EU, Japan, and most OECD
nations. Nuclear weapons are not difficult to make. Bomb technology is widely
known and accessible. The only bottleneck is processed uranium and plutonium,
which all states potentially hostile to the western democracies can get-at least in
limited quantities. Ample western counterforce, with adequate and survivable
delivery systems, is the only real deterrent. Missile defense technology may well
be worth developing, at least against rogue states. Missile defense is unlikely,
however, to be sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for nuclear deterrence,
i.e., ample nuclear warhead stocks and survivable delivery systems (aircraft,
missiles, and nuclear submarines).
Does this mean nuclear Armageddon? Not really. In fact, multipolar nuclear
deterrence is more reliable than bipolar nuclear deterrence, because it is
inherently more survivable. In other words, it is much harder with pre-emptive
strikes to knock out the nuclear capabilities of six, seven, or eight major nuclear
powers in a multipolar system. The mutual fear of United States and U.S.S.R.
pre-emptive strikes had been a driving force in the bipolar Cold War arms race
(1946-1991), and survivable second strike capability was crucial to peace.
What about rogue state military and nuclear programs, such as Iraq, Iran, or
North Korea? Rogue states are better deterred in an environment of ample
Western nuclear weapons capability. Assured western deterrence is really more
menacing to rogue states which have only a few or limited numbers of nuclear
warheads. The worst case defense scenario, in fact, would be a drastic, one sided
Western drawdown of nuclear and other military strength by the United States,
EU, Japan and other OECD allies.
Many experts argue that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks reshuffled
the deck of world politics, threat scenarios, and appropriate grand strategy
responses. In the summer of 2001, for example, U.S. experts were concerned
about potential Chinese aggressiveness (prompted by the forcing down of a U.S.
electronic surveillance plane), renewed Russian military-political pressures on
"near abroad" states, Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
North Korea dangers, and the problems of Colombia-Venezuela and growing
disorder in the Andean-Panama region. Many believed that U.S. forces and
readiness needed extensive strengthening, along with overdue replacement of
aging U.S. aircraft and naval vessels. Others resisted increases, hoping for a
better peacekeeping climate. By late fall of 2004, many agreed that the United
States should increase defense budgets, somewhat for all these reasons, in
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addition to the economic recovery benefits of enlarged U.S. defense spending to
help offset a serious U.S. and global slowdown.
Fortunately, a somewhat improved attitude of Russia's Putin government
emerged. Their support for U.S. air operations, and aid through the Turkestans to
the northern alliance in Afghanistan eased U.S. insecurities on the Russian
relations front. Pakistan's support of the United States was welcome, albeit many
disruptive fundamentalist sympathizers that exist in Pakistan. Even China toned
down recent hostility to the United States after September 11, 2001, although
more mutual reassurance will be needed for Beijing and the United States over
the coming years.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a prime U.S. concern, but after
September 11, 2001, its parameters shifted. With the new "War on Terrorism"
the United States has less patience for terrorist attacks against Israel. But the
United States still needs to be seen as "fair" and not menacing to Arabs (except
those declared enemies of the United States like Osama bin Laden and Al
Kaeda). Continued U.S. pressure for a balanced Mid-East peace settlement is
desirable for the United States to maintain support among moderate Arab states,
European allies, Japan, and neutral developing nations. Al Kaeda and Iraqi
propaganda linked the United States to Israeli "oppression of Palestinians."
Although Arafat rejected the last Camp David-Taba U.S. peace proposals (fall of
2000), continued American support for a "fair" Mid-East peace settlement is
important to the maintenance of its a la carte coalition against Al Kaeda. Recent
Geneva Accord proposals may be helpful too. Neglect of "fairness" could
unravel the U.S.-led coalition and topple moderate Moslem governments
(Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and even Jordan). Of course, the
United States cannot by itself deliver or impose peace on Israel and the
Palestinians. However, Americans should be understood as seeking a "genuine"
peace accord for the Mid-East. Americans, most Europeans, and neutrals now
have this appreciation, which has been built up over many years by U.S.
mediation efforts, including President Carter's Camp David Accord in 1978, and
the more recent Oslo process years (1993-2000). Interestingly, Arafat's death in
late fall of 2004, may signal a window of opportunity for more realistic
negotiations.
Nuclear proliferation dangers received increasing attention from 2002-2004.
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq (and cash flow from expanded oil exports)
threatened to provide resources for significant nuclear weapons developments.
Saddam also proclaimed goals of uniting all Arabs and the destruction of Israel.
President Bush urged stronger measures to change this regime and/or eliminate
its nuclear threat. Allies disagreed on the urgency of this Iraqi threat. Some
favored strict WMD inspections, others wanted tougher deterrence measures
(nuclear, if necessary), while still others endorsed military action.7 Although
7. In retrospect Saddam could have been removed in 1991, but the U.S.-led Gulf War coalition feared a
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Bush received nearly three to one support from both houses of the U.S. Congress
in a war powers resolution in October, 2002, the situation was a tough challenge
for the United States in its "leadership" of free world countries! When Bush
launched military forces against Iraq in March 2003, Allied support was limited.
The Iraq intervention and nuclear proliferation were crucial issues for 2003
to 2004. The United States and key allies had three main choices: (i) Intervention
to eliminate Saddam Hussein's regime. This would be costly and should not have
been undertaken without a clear commitment to win with ample forces. A limited
effort like the Vietnam War could be a tragic failure, which would encourage
anti-Western forces and terrorism in the world; (ii) Strong Deterrence and
Containment with ample U.S. nuclear warheads (for U.S. air and naval forces) to
prevent any further aggression or terrorism against U.S. and allied interests; and
power vacuum and did not want to humiliate Gorbachev's weakened USSR government that spring. This
opportunity for an easy Iraq regime change was missed.
8. A tricky problem for the United States is the linkage between Iraqi regime change and the Israel-
Palestine conflict. Most countries have little respect for Saddam Hussein, and welcomed a less dangerous
government. However, many countries did not want involvement in another mid-east war, and more would
support the United States if it would somehow bring "peace" between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Unfortunately, after four years of resumed intifada and suicide-bombing, the Israeli public has largely lost
faith in Arafat and the Palestinian willingness to accept Israel's existence. The Oslo formula of "land for peace"
broke down over requirements for Israeli security and a fair trade-off between Israeli settlements and the return
of Palestinian refugees. Israel would not survive with any general "return" of Arab refugees (and all their
descendants) from the War of Israeli independence in 1948, so that the nearly successful Taba accord of late
December, 2000 provided for only minimal return of Palestinian refugees in exchange for only minimal
retention of Israeli-settlements in the West Bank. Joint capitals in the Jemsalem area would be acceptable on
both sides, provided that Palestinians receive almost all of the West Bank and Gaza as their territory, and that
Israeli land and air forces retain full security jurisdiction over these external borders (including the Jordan river
and Galilee). Both sides must accept full recognition of their mutual historical legitimacy in the lands of Israel
and Palestine, and a Joint Religious Commission could be established for all faiths with jurisdiction to preserve
and protect their historical and religious sites in these areas. This Commission should have co-qual
representation of Jews, Muslims, and Christians (including Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Armenian, and
Syrian). The guiding principle for a realistic Israeli-Palestinian compromise should be two peoples living in
peace, side-by-side, with full respect for their historical and religious rights, and strong security guarantees.
Because terrorism threatens Israeli existence from Hamas, Hezbollah, and AI-Aksa brigades, Israel will insist
upon its rights to protect their external borders, airspace, and police terrorism. A compromise peace along these
lines would be seen as fair and reasonable in most parts of the world, and could receive endorsement by the UN
Security Council. Finally, the recent Saudi proposal of full normalization of relations between Israel and all
Arab-states should be part of this final settlement, which would allow Palestinian refugees to get full citizenship
in the Arab nations of their choice.
Healthy regime change in Iraq was difficult. Possibilities in November 2002 were: (i) soft containment;
(ii) weak inspections; (iii) strong inspections and sanctions; (iv) support Iraqi insurgents (and perhaps
assassinations); (v) hard deterrence with forward nuclear deployment; (vi) slow, steady air campaign like
Kosovo; (vii) large conventional campaign like Gulf War; (viii) selective nuclear strikes against Saddam's
palaces, republican guards, and head quarters. Weak options risked Iraqi aggression and subversion against
moderate and weak Moslem states (e.g., South Arabia, other Gulf States, Jordan, and Egypt), but strong options
with large Iraqi casualties risk alienating the Arab world.
North Korea did not seem so difficult because that regime is weak and surrounded by stronger powers
(including China, Russia, and the United States -all with large stocks of nuclear weapons). To the Bush
administration, Saddam's Iraq was more dangerous, because many moderate Arab-states in the Mid-East were
weaker and lacked secure governments. Until Saddam's regime was changed or becomes more peaceable, Iraq
presented a serious threat to that region, moderate Arab states, and U.S. interests.
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(iii) Softer deterrence and inspections by the UN to identify Iraqi WMD
programs and gain broader allied support. However, if the UN inspectors failed
in 2003, to uncover significant evidence of a clandestine Iraqi nuclear program,
then allied support for direct U.S. military intervention would be undercut. Those
opposing military intervention wanted a generous period (about nine to twelve
months) for UN inspection efforts. But political support in the United States and
among allies for military action would erode in a year, so that those eager for
intervention felt it best to act promptly. Weather conditions in the Persian Gulf
also made a campaign in October to April more feasible than from May to
September. Thus, U.S.-allied military action in Iraq was undertaken in early
2003.
U.S. and coalition forces overthrew Saddam's regime in a five week
blitzkrieg (from March to April 2003). Thereafter, Iraq's reconstruction bogged
down a year later with increased opposition and terrorism. Many felt that
substantially larger U.S. forces should have been deployed to provide more
security. Some wanted a faster handoff and earlier elections for the Iraqi's.
Unfortunately, Ambassador Bremer used an overbroad ban on the Baath party,
police, and military people. This ban widened the network of Iraqi opposition. In
contrast, some Saudi's advised that most Iraqi government officials and army
should have been retained with a generous three month salary payment to
encourage loyalty to a successor regime. How big was a realistic "makeover" for
Iraq under all these circumstances? Few Iraqis regretted Saddam's overthrow.
But provisional government and elections should have been put together within
six to nine months. U.S. "occupation" officials were naive and unrealistic about
Iraqi tolerance for a leisurely U.S. reconstruction. Also, the United States should
have welcomed prompt UN, French, German, and even Russian involvement, if
possible, to broaden international support. Ironically, after the quick overthrow of
Saddam, some nations that sharply criticized the U.S.-led intervention were
willing to temporarily endorse a "successful" transformation. However, some
U.S. allies later cut back their support after an extensive Iraqi uprising developed
in the spring of 2004. Of course, those critical of the Bush intervention at the
outset complained that such difficulties were predictable and hardly surprising.
Sadly, these delays and disruptions weakened U.S. and allied support and
increased casualties in Iraq. The disruptions could limit American staying power,
especially with the upcoming 2004 election. Naturally, die-hard Saddamites, Al-
Kaeda, and other anti-U.S. elements welcomed a reversal of fortunes, and
pressed harder in their intimidation campaigns against moderate Iraqis. At the
end of 2004, it was unclear how the U.S.-regime change efforts might work out.
It could take a few more years for this conflict to be resolved. Prospects were
fiercely debated and uncertain. 9
9. Many people in the Bush administration believed that the Iraq intervention was necessary to pre-empt
the dangers of anti-western fanaticism and terrorism spreading in the Arab and other Muslim states. Broader
support for the United States and its coalition would follow if the United States could persevere and
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Unfortunately, this leaves terrorism from Al-Qaeda as a continuing threat to
U.S. security interests and some allies around the world. North Korea's
determination to continue its nuclear weapons program is another serious
problem, together with Iran's on-going nuclear weapons developments. The main
danger is not an attack by either state, but from collaboration in nuclear weapons
development with other rogue states or organizations (like Al-Qaeda). A
potential threat could come from Chavez, the Venezuelan dictator, who could
finance anti-U.S. guerillas or terrorists in Latin America from large oil exports.
Many moderate Islamic regimes (like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, other Persian
Gulf States, and Indonesia) are targets for terrorist assassination, disruption, or
pressure against U.S. interests and friends. For all these reasons, substantial U.S.
military force levels (naval, air, ground, and nuclear weapons) will be needed for
some years at least, regardless of how U.S. intervention in Iraq (2003-2005) turns
out.
Whatever the United States did about Iraq, i.e., a costly U.S.-led intervention
or a major increase in U.S. deterrent forces in the region, a significant increase in
U.S. military outlays was needed. The mix of forces probably would mainly be
conventional for an early war. However, more substantial air-naval-nuclear
forces will be required for the Mid-East and western pacific regardless (to deal
with Iraq, Al-Qaeda, and North Korea) over the longer run.
In any event, the United States should now increase its overall defense
spending, which had been cut too far back in the later 1990s (See Chart 3). U.S.
defense spending has fluctuated greatly over its long history. Substantial
increases occur for external threats and wars.'" Now for 2004-2005 another up-
surge in U.S. defense spending and homeland security is required. U.S. defense
outlays, border control, and public health measures should be increased from
$355 billion by at least $150 billion annually (or about forty percent). This would
bring U.S. defense spending as a share of GNP to at least 4.5 percent annually.
Included would be increased navy, air, and land forces (at least twenty to twenty-
five percent), improved readiness, considerable replacement of aging aircraft and
naval vessels, and renewal of nuclear forces and their readiness. Some outlays for
missile defense, pilot programs, and testing are desirable (but nothing major until
this technology is proven). U.S. defense increases include essential militarily (to
successfully "hand off' to a moderate Iraqi regime. Skeptical critics worried that U.S. efforts could easily fail
and aggravate the dangers of anti-U.S. backlashes. Many remained unsure, including other nations. But the
"winning forces" in Iraq would get bandwagon benefits of increased backing in the Mid-East and Muslim
world. The 2004 U.S. election complicated the struggle. The Bush re-election did provide more credibility for
U.S. staying power for awhile. A successful handoff to Iraqi's remains crucial for the U.S. and coalition efforts.
10. Major U.S. war emergencies were the undeclared war against France from 1798 to 1799, the war of
1812 to 1815, the Civil War (1861 to 1865), World War I (1914-1918), World War n1 (1940 to 1945), and the
Cold War (1946 to 1991). (See Chart 3). In the post-Cold War era the Bush administration cut defense spending
from six to 4.5 percent of GNP (1989 to 1993). Clinton's administration and Congress cut defense spending
much further between 1993-2000, i.e., from 4.5 to 2.8 percent of GNP. In retrospect, these recent cuts went too
far. More like 4.5 percent is needed again until the Iraq intervention is resolved, along with other security
challenges in the Mid-East, Korea, and Caribbean.
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rebuild more strength, for the Iraq crisis, and a continued "War on Terrorism"),
but just as important, an overall economic stimulus. If further defense outlays
become needed over the longer term (e.g., ten to twelve years), then sur-taxes or
value-added taxes should follow for healthy fiscal discipline (to limit inflation).
Remember that U.S. defense spending was relatively high through most of the
Cold War from 1950-1990."
III. CONCLUSIONS
The global economy of the early twenty-first century is a mixed picture. On
the one hand, rapid industrial progress and improving technology are good news
for most of humanity. But the world marketplace is under strain. The trade
regime is too rigid, somewhat fragile, and fosters asymmetries, free riding, and
imbalance problems. The present WTO is stuck in a logjam of conflicting
interests, with little prospect for multilateral resolution. Only more realistic
regional and bilateral trade deals are likely to improve the trade situation. The
finance regime is in better shape, but has been strained by excessive speculation,
hot money flows, and disruptive financial and banking crises. Misaligned
currencies are a serious problem. The poorest countries suffer unmet financial
needs, but substantial progress for them requires more responsible governments
and better security arrangements. The world's security regime has become
strained lately. Over-confidence, naivet6, anti-military attitudes, and neglect
aggravate these problems. Sadly, in much" of the world, i.e., the Mid-East, Africa,
the Americas, and parts of Asia there are active conflicts or strained relations.
Lessons from the 1930s, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era teach that
western-style democracies (United States, EU, and other OECD states) should
not neglect their armed forces, and particularly their nuclear deterrent and
delivery systems. Thus, the international trade, finance, and security regimes all
need serious work, architectural improvements, and careful political handling in a
multi-polar world.
Skillful, respectful, and realistic diplomacy is essential. Arrogant and
domineering pressure from the United States will not be successful. Extensive
resentments against the United States have already accumulated much around the
globe. We must better appreciate that all major powers, and lots of lesser states,
have important concerns and vital interests. The United States must learn to listen
more patiently, and show more teamwork.
11. The outcome for the recent U.S. intervention in Iraq was unclear in 2004, although the Bush re-
election allowed more time for the intervention efforts. Initial U.S. and allied military operations were
successful, but the economic-political-military reconstruction effort was slow and uneven, with growing
opposition. Critics include those wanting stronger U.S. forces, better supervision, and a faster "handoff' to
Iraqi's, while others doubted the overall feasibility of U.S. and allied intervention and its desirability.
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On the other hand, the United States has important economic, industrial,
agricultural, and trade balance interests of its own. It is unrealistic to believe that
the United States can or should make unreasonable or disproportionate sacrifices
of its own interests in order to procure collaboration from others. No. The theme
of U.S. policy should be mutual gains, trade, and security with as many countries
as possible.
